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ABSTRACT 
Studies of criminal-court dispositions have traditionally aggregated courts along political and geo- 
graphic boundaries. This article suggests that courts should be analyzed individually, even within the 
same jurisdiction, as a means of increasing the explanatory capacity of the variables involved. Further, 
it is contended that intercourt differences are a result of organizational infiuences operating within 
each court. 
The literature on courts suggests that (rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence, in- 
judges have enormous latitude in allocating capacitation). The composition of the court- 
sanctions among convicted offenders. This room work group (judge, prosecutor. and 
sentencing discretion allows for substantial defense counsel) was found by Eisenstein 
variation in the treatment of individuals and Jacob (1977) to be a major explanatory 
before the bench. Over time many re- variable; different work-group combina- 
searchers have attempted to articulate the tions produced different sentencing out- 
factors that influence sentencing disposi- comes. Marvin Frankel, a judge, himself 
tions in criminal courts. Hogarth (1971). in a described judicial decision making on sanc- 
study of Toronto magistrates, found that tions as existing within a “sentencing wilder- 
sentencing decisions were influenced by ness.” an opinion further developed in his 
many variables. one of the most important sarcastically entitled book Criminal Sen- 
of which was the jurist’s penal philosophy tences (Frankel. 1972, 1973). 
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For the most part. research on courts has 
centered on demonstrating the obvious 
sources of variation in sentencing by com- 
paring outcomes across political jurisdic- 
tions. Even Eisenstein and Jacob concen- 
trated most of their effort on comparing the 
explanatory power of their model in three 
urban areas in different states. State laws 
and judicial customs differ, and. therefore, 
it is not surprising that the model would 
provide differing results. 
This stress on interstate dispositional pat- 
terns has masked a potentially important 
research focus by ignoring the variation in 
sentencing that exists within the same politi- 
cal jurisdiction; in other words, within 
intrastate sanctioning practices. Even when 
studies have been conducted within a par- 
ticular jurisdiction, the tendency has been to 
treat the state, region, city. or county as 
though sentencing practices were uniform 
across all of the courts within the jurisdic- 
tion. An examination of Hagan’s (1974) 
review article on “extralegal attributes” 
demonstrates the existing narrowness of 
vision concerning intercourt variation within 
a state. The article provides a table that lists 
“salient” independent. dependent. and le- 
gal variables that have been controlled in 
nearly every major study of sentencing done 
in the United States since 1928. Omitted 
from all of the studies examined, as well as 
from Hagan’s review, is any research that 
examines variation among courts within the 
same local jurisdiction. What this means is 
that all courts in huge states, such as 
Pennsylvania or North Carolina. and all 
courts in large urban areas, such as Detroit 
and Philadelphia, are treated as though they 
were the same. 
While some studies have examined intra- 
state sentencing patterns, they have not 
controlled for individual courts. Bullock 
(1961) examined the influence of race upon 
sentencing decisions in Texas but aggre- 
gated the courts according to a rural/urban 
conceptualization. Scholars recently have 
begun to address more directly the problem 
of intercourt sentencing variation; for ex- 
ample, Brereton and Casper (19X1) found 
that some California counties use real sanc- 
tions and differential sentencing to induce 
guilty pleas. This means that differing court 
jurisdictions administering the same state 
laws tend to produce varying results. How- 
ever. opportunities for further research in 
the area of intercourt sentencing variation 
have not been exploited yet to any substan- 
tial degree. The following study examines 
the variation in criminal dispositions among 
court jurisdictions in Connecticut. 
THE RESEARCH 
This research examines the sentencing of 
felony defendants who faced charges in 
five of Connecticut’s nine superior-court 
locations: Hartford. New Haven, Middle- 
sex. Tolland. and Windham. The purpose 
of this article is to demonstrate the differ- 
ences found in each of the courts and to 
show that generalizations across courts 
must be made very tentatively. If it can be 
demonstrated that there are major differ- 
ences in courts operating under the same 
penal code within one state. then compar- 
ing and generalizing about courts in a 
broader framework may be problematic. 
To examine intercourt sentencing varia- 
tion, data were collected on 401 convicted 
felony defendants in five of the nine supe- 
rior-court locations in Connecticut for the 
period of June 1, 1974, to May 31. 1975. The 
choice of courts for analysis is significant. 
New Haven and Hartford together account 
for over half the felony arrests in the state. 
Of the four busiest superior courts (Hart- 
ford. New Haven. New London, and Fair- 
field). Hartford and New Haven are the 
largest and appear, from the available 197-t 
aggregate data, to be highly dissimilar. 
Whereas in Hartford more than 74 percent 
of all dispositions result in convictions. in 
New Haven over 51 percent of all disposi- 
tions terminate without convictions. In 
Hartford X7 percent of the cases are dis- 
posed of in less than six months, in New 
Haven over half the cases take one year or 
longer. In the smaller communities (opera- 
tionalized to mean fewer than one hundred 
felony dispositions in FY IY74). Tolland and 
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Windham seem to be similar, while both 
differ markedly from Middlesex Superior 
Court. The final selection, thus, includes a 
sample of cases from five courts. including 
rural and city, high-volume and low-volume 
courts. ’ 
The predominant method for gathering 
data included an examination of convicted 
defendants’ files made available by the State 
of Connecticut’s Department of Adult Pro- 
bation. Individual files consist of a face 
sheet, the presentence investigation, and 
the state attorney’s information. These files, 
maintained at various probation offices 
throughout the state, reveal information 
ranging from background characteristics of 
the defendants (e.g., race, sex, occupation, 
prior criminal record) to the interactions 
between the defendant and the court (e.g., 
disposition of sentence, type of lawyer, 
length of time between arrest and convic- 
tion). The uniformity of the reports greatly 
facilitates the collection of data. 
A second method of gathering data in- 
volved direct observation of the courts in 
action. The closed nature of the court 
system-the attempt to hide actions from 
outsiders-presents problems of data analy- 
sis on at least three levels. On one level, 
much of the court’s important work takes 
place apart from public view, so that inter- 
ested observers see only the end product. A 
court clerk in Hartford said, “We do more 
in the back room than we do in the court. 
That’s where all the plea bargaining takes 
place.“’ On a second level, the attitude of 
system officials is that their work, by right, 
should be secret. The same clerk said one 
had to ask his permission to sit and take 
notes in open court. On a third level, there 
is a legal obstacle. The Connecticut General 
Assembly has enacted an erasure law that 
disallows examination of a defendant’s re- 
cord if he or she has been acquitted or no1 
pressed. Because of these three problem 
areas, certain seemingly key variables and 
cases were not collectible. Different pleas 
and the number and kinds of continuances 
are kept only in the court clerk’s files. As a 
result of the control the clerk exercises. it is 
impossible to study the effect, for example, 
of increasing the number of continuances on 
the dispositional process (Banfield and An- 
derson, 1968). Also, the law precludes 
studying both acquitted and convicted 
defendants. 
ANALYSIS 
In the initial stages, the analysis of sources 
of intercourt sentencing variation was 
grounded in the concepts and methodolo- 
gies suggested in the literature discussed 
above. A relatively large number of vari- 
ables were examined to determine the ex- 
tent to which they influence the severity of 
disposition in Connecticut’s superior courts. 
The independent variables were reduced 
through a number of stepwise-regression 
procedures that deleted variables with little 
explanatory strength. The list of empirical 
indicators included standard information, 
such as offense charged; condition of victim; 
victim knew offender; premises of offense; 
age, sex, prior record, employment status, 
education, race, and mental status of defen- 
dant; amount of bond; offender’s story; 
time between arrest and disposition; num- 
ber of eyewitnesses available.” A severity- 
of-disposition-interval-level scale was the 
dependent variable in this analysis.’ Prob- 
lems of multicollinearity and autocorrela- 
tion were explored, and when two variables 
had a highly significant relationship, one 
was deleted. 
Initially. the data were aggregated for all 
five courts, and the explanatory power of 
the variables that we employed was ex- 
tremely limited.5 When the data were disag- 
gregated, through the use of physical con- 
trols for court locations, an interesting set of 
findings emerged. When analyzed on a 
court-by-court basis, the explanatory capac- 
ity of the variables improved markedly. This 
indicates that lumping the state’s courts 
together may tend to mask the significance 
of the relationships between independent 
and dependent variables. The conclusion 
here is that the most appropriate method for 
analyzing variations between courts is to 
examine each court individually. The reason 
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for this conclusion is that statistical control 
tends to obscure variation by using a mathe- 
matical averaging process that shows equal 
variations in opposite directions as having 
no influence. 
Table 1, below. summarizes the findings, 
grouped by court location, of the regression 
analysis. Each court has a nearly discrete set 
of factors that influence the severity of 
disposition in Connecticut’s superior courts. 
The size of the standardized beta-weights 
and ?‘s for each court are impressive. When 
these results developed, our intuition about 
intracourt variation received credence, and 
it was then necessary to develop a reason- 
able explanation of why it is possible to 
explain the process of disposition for indi- 
vidual courts, but not for the aggregation at 
the state level. A more detailed discussion 
of Table 1 provides some insights into this 
problem. 
Table 1 is complicated, so care is neces- 
sary in examining and interpreting the infor- 
mation provided. The first striking features 
are the 2’s. For each of the court locations. 
there is a relatively important r’, ranging 
from .42 (Windham) to .59 (Middlesex). In 
the social sciences, numbers of this magni- 
tude do not arise randomly, and it is 
therefore vital to understand exactly what 
these results represent. A second interesting 
facet of Table 1 is that the variables that 
make up the percentage of variation ex- 
plained are largely unique to each court. For 
example, the following variables are impor- 
tant in Windham: undercover agent used, 
reduced conviction, and time between 
arrest-disposition. In Hartford the salient 
variables are amount of bond, charged 
offense, and convicted at trial. The overall 
2’s for Hartford and Windham are similar- 
.4X and .42, respectively-but the variables 
that produce the i’s are completely differ- 
ent. Similar situations exist in each of the 
courts, and it is useful at this juncture to 
briefly describe the most important vari- 
ables (those that make up the bulk of the 
i’s) for each court location. 
In Hartford the most salient variable is 
clearly amount of bond, with charged of- 
fense and convicted at trial coming in a 
distant second and third. This differs in New 
Haven, where the important variable is 
condition of victim. with number of prior 
felony convictions second and convicted at 
trial third. As in New Haven. in Middlesex 
the strongest predictor is condition of vic- 
tim. followed by number of prior felony 
convictions and money or goods taken. A 
fourth variable. amount of bond (which 
overlaps with the Hartford Court), adds 
slightly to the explained variance. The 
amount of bond is the most important 
explanatory variable in Tolland. just as it is 
in Hartford. The remaining factors in Tol- 
land are completely unique; employment 
and other evidence available fill the second 
and third slots. Finally, the Windham court 
represents another unique blend of compo- 
nents; undercover agent used provides the 
bulk of the explained variance. and reduced 
conviction and time between arrest-disposi- 
tion add a small increment to the total i. 
The courts in Connecticut each manifest a 
markedly different character in terms of the 
variables that explain sentencing severity. 
At this point, it is appropriate to address the 
topic of exactly how it is possible to explain 
sentencing variation in individual courts, 
but not possible in the aggregation of 
Connecticut superior courts. The answer 
has two parts: one. methodological and 
technical and the other. theoretical and 
conceptual. 
First, let us discuss the technical aspects of 
why the explanatory power of the model 
increases when courts are physically con- 
trolled. When stepwise regression is used. it 
is possible to establish parameters for the 
deletion of variables that do not significantly 
add to the total ; (Nie et al.. 1975.) For the 
purpose of this research, we established the 
deletion threshold at beta > .lO and i > 
.Ol. This means that any variable that did 
not exceed both thresholds was deleted 
from the regression procedure. The ultimate 
impact of this process was to delete most of 
the.variables, because very few were impor- 
tant to a majority of the courts, and aggre- 
gation caused the courts to be treated as a 
single unit. For example, undercover agents 
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Windham; however, it was not important (b 
>.lO and ?> .Ol) in the other courts. 
Aggregation of the courts would eliminate 
this variable because it did not exceed the 
deletion threshold for the state of Connecti- 
cut as a unit. Most of the salient variables 
were similarly situated, and the explanatory 
power of the analysis greatly diminished. 
In a theoretical sense. it is easily possible 
to understand how aggregation can mask a 
diversity of phenomena. If we speak of the 
Democratic Party as a unit, we risk combin- 
ing elements that are very diverse. For 
example, George Wallace is a Democrat 
and Edward Kennedy is a Democrat, but 
their views are dissimilar on a number of 
issues. Alternatively, Ronald Reagan is a 
Republican, as is Lowell Weiker; lumping 
the two together surely reduces the clarity 
provided by viewing them as individuals. 
We are not claiming that courts are as 
uniquely individual as people, but, at least 
to a degree, it is plausible to assume that 
courts have significant differences, even 
within the same state. This important theo- 
retical development is supported by the 
analysis provided in Table 1. The courts in 
Connecticut are indeed diverse; important 
factors vary from location to location. How 
much better an understanding of the pro- 
cesses of criminal justice might we have now 
if the studies reviewed by Hagan had in- 
cluded individual courts as an important 
control variable? 
Another way of looking at Table 1 pro- 
vides an interesting perspective on the 
operation of criminal courts. If the indepen- 
dent variables are carefully examined, they 
seem to break down into three analytical 
categories: characteristic of the act. of the 
accused, and of the organizational influ- 
ences of the criminal-justice system. The 
characteristics of the act refer to the vari- 
ables that surround the particular crime 
being dealt with by the court. In Table 1 
characteristics of the act might include 
offense charged. condition of victim. and 
money or goods taken. Similarly. the char- 
acteristics of the accused refer to such things 
as number of prior felony convictions and 
employment. Finally, the characteristics of 
the organizational influences of the crimi- 
nal-justice system refer to the components 
of the process that can be manipulated, or 
that were expended, by the system to 
proceed with case. These variables might 
include amount of bond. convicted at trial. 
number of eyewitnesses. other evidence 
available, undercover agents used, reduced 
conviction. and time between arrest- 
disposition.’ If these three categories make 
sense, then it is obvious that the most 
explanatory variables in Table 1 relate to 
the organizational influences of the crimi- 
nal-justice system. This interpretation sug- 
gests that the variables that are most impor- 
tant in understanding severity of disposition 
in Connecticut courts are organizational. In 
three of the five courts. the most salient 
variable is organization related (Hartford, 
Tolland, and Windham), while the act is 
most important in the remaining two courts 
(New Haven and Middlesex). This perspec- 
tive does not diminish the principal finding 
of Table 1, because organizational influ- 
ences vary from court to court. Our inter- 
pretation is speculative at this stage. but 
would certainly ht nicely with the “crime- 
control” model discussed by Packer (1980). 
From a crime-control perspective. the bu- 
reaucratic nature of the criminal-justice 
system is the dominant force in the process- 
ing of criminals in the United States. Our 
finding that the organizational needs of the 
system influence the severity of sentences in 
individual courts fits nicely into a crime- 
control model. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This paper has attempted to till a gap that 
exists in the literature discussing the disposi- 
tional processes of criminal courts. Specifi- 
cally, we examined sentencing severity in 
five Connecticut superior courts. At first, 
we were guided by the standard theoretical 
structure of the discipline. which stresses 
statewide aggregation of courts. This pro- 
cess produced results that were not impor- 
tant and did not help to explain variation in 
sentencing. However, when the disposi- 
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tional data were disaggregated, through 
physical control for individual courts, the 
results were significant. In essence, we 
found that while the state courts could not 
be explained as a group, they could be 
articulated very well on the basis of individ- 
ual court locations. The conclusion is that 
the superior courts are sufficiently diverse 
that it clouds our understanding to speak of 
them as a single, aggregate unit. Further, we 
found that the variables that had the most 
impact in the most settings were related to 
the organizational needs of the criminal- 
justice system. 
This research suggests two things. First 
and foremost, we must begin to come to grips 
with the problem of the aggregation of crimi- 
nal courts by states or large metropolitan 
areas. Table 1 demonstrates, at a minimum, 
that there is sufficient reason to pursue re- 
search on sentencing criteria on a court-by- 
court basis. This has not been done in the 
past, and our understanding of court pro- 
cesses has suffered correspondingly. Second, 
and more tentatively. this research suggests 
that the disposition of criminal cases may be 
related to the organizational needs of the 
criminal-justice system. This line of inquiry 
should also be pursued on a court-by-court 
basis. as the organizational needs of the sys- 
tem appear to be location specific. 
Finally. this study has important implica- 
tions for the study of criminal-justice reform 
and. more specifically, sentencing reform. If 
courts within the same state are indeed some- 
what unique, then doesn’t it follow that re- 
medies for disparity in sentencing should also 
be related to particular courts? This conclu- 
sion implies that the type of sentencing re- 
form suggested by Nagel (1983). whereby 
states alter their criminal codes to adopt the 
average sentences meted out in the past, is 
doomed to failure. because the averages are 
distorted by the aggregation problem we 
have described. This research demonstrates 
that one of the most salient features of intra- 
state sentencing variation is the individual 
flavor of the particular court organizations 
themselves. Therefore. we suggest that seri- 
ous considerations of sentencing reform be 
premised upon an adequate understanding 
of the criteria that have influenced sentenc- 
ing in the past. Until we stop grouping to- 
gether courts, even within the same political 
jurisdiction, as though they were the same, 
an adequate understanding of the courts will 
be lacking. 
NOTES 
’ Because of the small number of felony dispositions 
each year in the light-volume courts. the cntirc popu- 
lation of cases was used; in Hartford and New Haven. 
systematic one-in-three samples were collected. 
’ All interviews were conducted between January IS. 
I975 and October IS, 1075. 
’ A complete examination of our variable list and code 
hook exceeds the space availability of this paper. 
The coding of the variables used in Table I are as 
follows: 
Variable Name: 
amount of bond 
charged offense 
convicted at trial 
condition of victim 
# of prior felony convictions 
money or goods taken 
# of eyewitnesses 
employment 
other evidence available 
Code: 
in dollars 
I = drugs 
2 = D l’elony 
3 = C felony 
4 = B felony 
S = A felony 
0 = no 
I = yes 
I = unharmed 




3 = attempted 
assault 




5 = killed 
0 = (1 
I = I 
etc. 
(I = no 
I = yes 
0 = 0 
I=1 
etc. 
0 = continually 
employed 
I = not 
continually 
employed 






I = all relevant 
evidence 
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undercover agents used 0 = no 
1 = yes 
reduced conviction 0 = yes 
I = no 
time between arrest-disposition in months 
’ Severity of disposition is the dependent variable. It is 
a measurement of the sentence meted out in court. It 
consists of eighty categories and was constructed 
from a number of variables: minimum sentence. 
maximum sentence, length of probation, and line. 
The key variable was minimum sentence, since 
most defendants’ release dates from Connecticut 
prisons are based on two-thirds of the mlnimum. The 
decision to add probation to a prison sentence 
necessitated an assumption about the relative impact 
of prison time versus probation. Each year in prison 
was treated the same as five years probation. 
The dependent variable starts at 0 (straight 
suspended sentence-no:ja,il time. no probation) and 
ranges up through 80 (mInImum sentence of twenty- 
two years). 
As an example of the coding scheme. IS on 
severity of disposition meant a sentence including a 
one-year minimum in prison; I6 meant a one-year 
minimum in prison plus one year of probation; 17 
meant a one-year minimum in prison plus two years 
probation; and so on. up to 70, which meant a 
minimum sentence of two years in prison or one year 
In prison and live years probation. 
’ For example. a series of relevant variables in a 
regression equation explalncd less than 19 percent. 
” For example. while number of eye witnesses mav be 
seen bv some as a characteristic of the offense.‘it is 
also a iactor that the judicial process can manipulate. 
During the plea-bargaining stage, the number of eye 
witnesses may convince the prosecutor either to 
forego plea hargalning or pursue it. In this sense. it is 
a variable the judicial process can use to its 
advantage In its negotiations with the defendant. 
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